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Abstract 
We use modified dictator games in which the productivity of taking or giving is varied. Subjects have 
to decide which of the different games will be payoff relevant in the end. We can show that the beha-
vior of dictators does not depend on the productivity of their gifts, but that their behavior is strongly 
influenced by the right to choose the relevant game. If the recipients have the right to choose, the dic-
tators become more generous.
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1. Introduction 
The experimental research of the last two decades has confronted economists with a great 
number of anomalies concerning individual behavior in various laboratory experiments. Sub-
jects make voluntary contributions in public good games, they cooperate in situations where 
defection is the dominant strategy, and they make significant donations when it comes to cha-
ritable giving. The standard approach of rational choice theory, combined with the standard 
assumption of strictly selfish behavior, cannot explain any of these observations. The chal-
lenge for economic theory is to explain, without departing too far from standard theory, why 
subjects deviate from strict selfishness.  
One way to tackle this challenge is to stick to the assumption that individuals decide strictly 
rationally, but to alter the assumptions concerning their aims and motives. With this research 
strategy, it is rather easy to construct theories that explain non-selfish behavior and at the 
same time contain selfishness as a special case. Thus, they are able to explain behavior the 
standard theory describes correctly. 
Currently, rational choice theories with new assumptions about individual preferences domi-
nate the market for explanations of non-standard behavior. Starting with RABIN'S (1993) at-
tempt to incorporate the idea of fairness into standard game theory, a great number of theories 
have been developed, all following the same research strategy. FEHR AND SCHMIDT (1999) and 
BOLTON AND OCKENFELS (2000) introduced the assumption that subjects may be inequality 
averse. ANDREONI AND MILLER (2002) and ANDREONI, CASTILLO AND PETRIE (2005) assume 
that people may harbor altruistic preferences and CHARNESS AND RABIN (2003) combine in-
equality aversion with a sense for reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior is at the center of the ap-
proaches of GEANAKOPLOS, PEARSE, AND STACCHETTI (1989), LEVINE (1998) and DUFWEN-
BERG AND KIRCHSTEIGER (2004) as well as FALK AND FISCHBACHER (2006). COX, FRIEDMAN, 
SADIRAJ (2008) extend ANDREONI AND MILLER (2002) by combining 'neoclassical' other-
regarding preferences with different forms of reciprocity. 
What all these theories have in common is that they are based on assumptions about prefe-
rences individuals may have for different distributions of payoffs. The only ingredient that 
goes beyond the assumptions on payoff distributions is reciprocity. For reciprocal behavior, it 
is essential that the fellow player has helping or harming intentions – and these intentions may 
not be fully reflected in particular payoff distributions. But besides this exception, all impor-
tant theories on individual behavior that are currently discussed can be characterized by the 
assumptions on the preferences over payoff distributions they use. This has an important im-
plication. Although these theories try to generate explanations for the entire spectrum of ano-
malies observed in the laboratory, the most important experimental test is given by non-
strategic games in which subjects only decide on payoff distributions. If the theories men-
tioned above fail to explain the choices of subjects in such games, their core assumptions 
would be confuted.  
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This is the reason for the revival of the scientific interest in dictator games. Experiments using 
dictator games seem to be the natural way to test the new generation of behavioral assump-
tions which dominate the field. ANDREONI AND MILER (2002) introduced a modification of the 
standard dictator game which proved to be able to test preference assumptions very effective-
ly. The modified dictator games differ from the standard games in an important aspect: Dicta-
tors distribute money between themselves and the recipients; the amount to be distributed, 
however, is not fixed, but varies systematically. Subjects are confronted with 'budget lines' 
which display different distributions of payoffs between self and other. By varying the slope 
of these budget lines it is possible to generate observations which allow various assumptions 
about preferences for payoff distributions to be tested.  
The modified dictator games introduced by ANDREONI AND MILLER are used by FISMAN, KA-
RIV AND MARKOVITS (2007). In a computerized experiment, they confronted subjects with 50 
different budget lines displayed on a computer screen. For each budget line, subjects were 
asked to click on the point representing their favorite distribution of payoffs given the particu-
lar budget restriction. With this technique FISMAN ET AL. collected 50 observations per subject 
and used these data to estimate a CES utility function. The main finding is that a large share 
of  individual behavior can be rationalized by the assumption that individual behavior can be 
described as following a CES utility function. The drawback, however, is that the parameters 
of the CES functions vary considerably. Subjects' behavior is extremely heterogeneous.  
There is a second paper which makes use of the modified dictator games and which shows a 
very different picture. BROSIG, RIECHMANN AND WEIMANN (2008) use two kinds of modified 
dictator games to test whether subjects behave consistently and if their behavior is stable over 
time. To investigate consistency, BROSIG ET AL. formulate very general versions of the theo-
ries of inequality aversion and altruism and check if one of these theories could consistently 
explain observed individual behavior in different modified dictator games. Stability of beha-
vior was investigated in a rather simple way. The experiments were repeated identically with 
the same subjects two times with one month in between each repetition (“wave”). All theories 
which try to explain individual behavior as the result of optimizing some kind of “other re-
garding preferences” implicitly assume not only that behavior is consistent but also that it is 
stable, because none of these theories says that preferences change over time. Consequently, 
testing the stability of behavior directly tests these theories.  
The results of BROSIG ET AL. are surprising in that they demonstrate that the repetition of the 
experiment leads to a strong dynamic of individual behavior. In the first wave, behavior was 
very similar to the observations reported in the literature on dictator games. Only a small frac-
tion of subjects showed selfish behavior, and the theories of inequality aversion and altruism 
could explain a substantial part of the non-selfish behavior. On the other hand, only a small 
proportion of subjects displayed consistent behavior over the different games.  But in the 
second and third wave the consistency rates increased sharply as more and more subjects de-
cided consistently selfishly. Moreover the standard approach of rational selfish behavior ex-
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plained more than 90% of all the observations of the last wave. The most important finding of 
BROSIG ET AL. concerns the stability of behavior. Only few subjects showed stable behavior 
over the course of the experiments and all of these were strictly selfish. There was no subject 
who displayed stable “other regarding preferences”. 
Based on the experimental evidence provided by the Fismen et al. and the Brosig et al. papers, 
what we can say about the behavior in dictator games is that subjects optimize very heteroge-
neous utility functions which change over time. This is neither an elegant way to describe be-
havior nor a way that allows us to make predictions on individual behavior in dictator games. 
The FISMAN ET AL. and the BROSIG ET AL. papers demonstrate that it may be fruitful to inves-
tigate the question of what rules behavior in non-strategic situations such as dictator games 
more deeply. Besides the standard interpretation of dictator game findings, there is an entirely 
different hypothesis, which is formulated by BARDSLEY (2008) and LIST (2007) . In their view, 
the surprising result is not that under some conditions dictators do not donate money. The re-
ally surprising result is that they do donate money in conventional dictator games. People 
need reasons for giving money to other people. What are their reasons in a simple dictator 
game? The conjecture by BARDSLEY and LIST is that the experimental setting activates social
norms of giving. Subjects receive a gift from the experimenter and then the same experimen-
ter asks them if they are willing to give some money to a different subject who was not lucky 
enough to get money from the experimenter. This procedure may indeed force subjects not to 
be too greedy and therefore to give some money to their peers. If this interpretation is correct, 
then changes in the experimental setting can destroy the norm activation. In their papers, 
BARDSLEY and LIST demonstrate this by giving the dictators not only the opportunity to give 
money to the recipient, but also to take money from him. The effect was that dictators decided 
to make their recipient a bit poorer, not richer. 
In a setting in which it is allowed to take money from the other player without any punish-
ment, the social norm that induced giving in the standard experiments vanishes. The same 
may be true of the change in the standard design introduced by BROSIG ET AL. When subjects 
are in the dictator position for the second and the third time, they may no longer feel obliged 
to conform to the norm that ruled their behavior in the first wave.  
CHERRY ET AL. (2002) add further evidence that the institutional setting of a dictator game 
may be of great importance. They demonstrate that dictators no longer make donations when 
they have to earn the money which can be divided between themselves and others.  
In this paper, we investigate the relation between institutions and the behavior of dictators fur-
ther. In order to do so, we also make use of the “modified dictator game methodology”. 
The modified dictator games introduced by ANDREONI AND MILLER confront subjects with 
situations where the relative price of the payoff to others in terms of the payoff to self is va-
ried. This price can be interpreted in the following way. A low price means that the payoff 
increase of the other for a given sacrifice of self is high. In other words, it is very productive 
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to give up own payoff for the sake of making a present to the other player. A high price indi-
cates low productivity because self has to give up a lot in order to increase the payoff of other.  
In our experiments, subjects either had to decide on their gifts in different games with differ-
ent degrees of productivity, or they could choose between games with different productivities. 
In the “take games”, dictators can increase their own payoff by taking money from the reci-
pient and in the “give games”, they can increase the payoff of recipients by transferring mon-
ey. This design allows us to disentangle the two possible decisions which are incorporated in 
one game in the design used by LIST and BARDSLEY. Furthermore, we varied the mechanism 
which determines the productivity of the dictator game. It was chosen randomly, by the dicta-
tor or by the recipient. Giving either the dictator or the recipient the power to decide which 
game will actually be played can be interpreted as a variation of the property rights over the 
games we offer to the subjects. If subjects decide on the basis of an evaluation of payoff dis-
tributions alone, the property right should not influence their decision. On the other hand, if 
we find that property rights do have an impact on the dictator decisions, this would support 
the view that social norms play a role.  
The main finding of our paper is that dictators seem to ignore the productivity of their gifts, 
but that they change their behavior if the productivity is chosen by the recipient as compared 
to the cases in which they decided themselves or the productivity was picked by chance. The 
distribution of property rights significantly influences the dictator decisions while relative 
prices, which are core elements of economic theory, do not.  
 
2. The games
We employed the modified dictator games as they were used in BROSIG ET AL. This means 
that we had two types of games – give games and take games.  
Take games 
In each of the four take games, starting with the initial endowment (AE, BE) = (500, 500)2, 
player A (the dictator) can reduce player B’s (the recipient) payoff by dB in order to increase 
his own payoff by dA at a constant relative price of pA = |dB / dA|, such that A = 500 + (1 / 
pA) (500  B). This budget constraint can be re-formulated as B = 500 + pA (500  A). Ac-
cordingly, the ‘budget line’ has a slope of dB / dA = – pA. The four games only differ with 
respect to this slope: In the first game, T1, we have pA = pAT1 = 1/2; in the remaining games, 
the values are pAT2 = 2/3, pAT3 = 1, and pAT4 = 2, respectively. Except for the equal payoff dis-
tribution, all possible options in the take games are chosen in such a way that player A is as-
sured of a higher payoff than player B, i.e., A > B. The experimental set-up of the four 
games is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
2  Here payoffs are measured in euro cent. 
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T1 
PA = ½  
A
B
500 
500 
600 
450 
700 
400 
800 
 350 
900 
 300 
1000 
250 
1100 
200 
1200 
150 
1300 
100 
1400 
50 
1500 
0 
T2 
PA = 2/3  
A
B
500 
500 
575 
450 
650 
400 
725 
 350 
800 
 300 
875 
 250 
950 
 200 
1025 
 150 
1100 
100 
1175 
 50 
1250 
 0 
T3 
PA = 1 
A
B
500 
500 
550 
450 
600 
400 
650 
350 
700 
300 
750 
250 
800 
200 
850 
150 
900 
100 
950 
50 
1000 
0 
T4 
PA = 2 
A
B
500 
500 
525 
450 
550 
400 
575 
350 
600 
300 
625 
250 
650 
200 
675 
150 
700 
100 
725 
50 
750 
0 
Table 1: Payoffs in the four take games in euro cent. 
Give games 
In each of the four give games, starting with the initial endowment (AE, BE) = (1500, 0), 
player A (the dictator) can increase player B’s (the recipient) payoff by dB at a personal cost 
of dA at a constant relative price of pA = |dB / dA|, such that A = 1500 –  (1/pA) B. Again, 
this budget constraint can be re-formulated as B = 750 – pA A. Accordingly, the ‘budget line’ 
has a slope of dB / dA = – pA. The four games only differ with respect to this slope: In the 
first game, G1, we have pA = pAG1 = ½; in the remaining games, the values are pAG2 = 3/4, pAG3 
= 1, and pAG4 = 5/4, respectively.  
 
G1 
PA = ½ 
A 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 
B 0 50 100 150 200 2500 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 
G2 
PA = ¾ 
A 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 
B 0 75 150 225 300 375 450 525 600 675 750 825 900 975 1050 1125 
G3 
PA = 1 
A 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 
B 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 
G4 
PA = 5/4 
A 1500 1400 1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 
B 0 125 250 375 500 625 750 875 1000 1125 1250 1375 1500 1625 1750 1875 
Table 2: Payoffs in the four give games in euro cent. 
 
Figure 1 displays the budget lines of both the give and the take games. Please note that for G1 
and T1 the lines are identical above the point (500, 500). 
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Figure 1: Budget lines in the take and give games 
 
3. Experimental design 
In each session, we had between 8 and 24 dictators and the corresponding number of reci-
pients located in separate rooms. Dictators (A-players) were told that they would be paired 
with one of the subjects in the other room (B-players) randomly. A- and B-players had no 
contact before or after the experiment. Either the four give games or the four take games were 
considered in each session. We altered the sequence of the games in some sessions in order to 
test sequence effects while we used modified instructions in other sessions to check the ro-
bustness of the results with respect to the wording of the instructions. It turned out that neither 
the wording nor the sequence had any significant effect. Thus we pooled the data. Table 3 
summarizes the experimental treatments. In total, we had 178 dictators (90 in the take games 
and 88 in the give games).  
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Game Session Order of Decisions Modified instructions Number of Subjects 
Take 
1 
D1, D2, D3 
no 
12 
2 22 
3-6 D3, D2, D1 8 
7 D1, D2, D3 yes 24 
Give 
1 
D1, D2, D3 
no 
12 
2 20 
3-6 D3, D2, D1 8 
7 D1, D2, D3 yes 24 
Table 3: Number of sessions, treatment variables, and number of subjects per session 
In all the “take sessions” and the “give sessions” (which were played with different subjects) 
the dictators had to make three decisions. In the following, we present parts from the instruc-
tions to the dictators in order to describe the decisions. 
Decision 1:
“Please indicate for each of the four games which of the given payoff distributions you want. 
After your decision one of the games will be chosen randomly and the payoff distribution you 
decided on will be the relevant payoff distribution for decision 1.” 
Decision 2: 
“First, you can choose one of the four games we offer. After that, please indicate which of the 
payoff distributions in the chosen game you prefer. This will be the relevant payoff distribu-
tion for decision 2.” 
Decision 3: 
“Now your B-Player will decide which game will be played. You will not be informed about 
his decision. Please indicate for each of the four games which payoff distribution you prefer. 
Together with the decision of the B-player this determines the relevant payoff distribution for 
decision 3.” 
The B-players had to make only one decision. They chose one of the four games in order to 
determine the payoffs belonging to decision 3. All subjects were informed that after the three 
decisions had been made, one of them would be chosen at random. The relevant payoff distri-
bution of this decision was paid to the subjects in euro and the experiment ended. All experi-
ments were computerized and the program was written with z-Treei. 
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4. Results
4.1 Choice of games 
In decision 2, the A-player (the dictator) decides which game will be relevant and, in decision 
3, it is the B-player (the recipient) who has the right to choose. For A-players this decision 
involves no strategic uncertainty. In the take sessions, it is a dominant strategy for A-players 
to choose T1, the game in which taking money from B is most productive. In the give ses-
sions, it is a weakly dominant strategy to select the most productive game, G4. If a dictator 
plans to give something to the B-player, he should select G4 because the price for any gift 
made to the B-player is lowest in G4. If he plans not to give anything, he should be indifferent 
between all four games.  
In decision 3, the B-player's decision as to which game to choose depends on his beliefs about 
the dictator’s reaction. If a recipient is interested in his own payoff, he should choose the 
game in which he believes that the dictator will give the  most or take the least. Therefore, not 
selecting G4 in the give sessions is only a rational choice if the B-player believes that the dic-
tator will give more in games in which it is more expensive to give than in G4 or that the dic-
tator will give nothing in all give-games. Other motivations, such as inequality aversion or 
altruism, can hardly account for a choice of G1 – G3 because, for every point X that can be 
reached in these games, there exists a point in G4 that Pareto dominates this point without 
changing the distributional properties of X.  
In the take sessions, if the B-player assumes that dictators have no sense of reciprocity, they 
should select the game with the lowest productivity of “taking away something”, T4. If he 
expects the dictator to take money, then the incentive to take is lowest in T4. But if the reci-
pient expects the dictator to behave reciprocally, he should choose the efficient game, T1. 
From the dictators point of view, this would be a nice move and reciprocal behavior should 
result in a decision which leaves more for the B-player than decisions in T2 – T4. Figures 2 
and 3 show the distributions of games chosen in the take and the give sessions by both the A- 
and the B-player: 
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Figure 2: Number of games chosen by A-players (decision 2) and B-players (decision 3) in the take sessions 
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Figure 3: Number of games chosen by A-players (decision 2) and B-players (decision3) in the give sessions 
In the take sessions, almost all A-players (83 of 90) chose T1, the most productive game. The 
A-players chose more productive games than the B-players (p=0.000, two-tailed Wilcoxon 
test). 54% (49 of 90) of the B-players chose T1, although the incentive for the dictator to 'take' 
money was strongest in this game. As already mentioned, a possible explanation is that they 
hoped for reciprocation or assumed that dictators would be satisfied with a fixed amount of 
money. In the latter case, the payoff for the B-player would be highest in T1 for any amount 
the dictator wanted for himself. 33% (30 of 90) of the recipients seemed to assume that the 
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dictator would reacts to the price pA and they chose T4, the game with the highest price for the 
dictator payoff. 
In the give sessions, 82% (72 of 88) of the B-players chose the efficient game G4, but only 
58% (51 of 88) of the dictators did so. The remaining 37 subjects chose either G1 or G3. 20 of 
them chose to give something to the B-player. It is not clear why so many dictators chose a 
dominated strategy. On average, the B-players chose games with a higher value of pA
(p=0.001, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). 
 
4.2 Behavior in the take games 
Figure 4 shows the payoff of the B-players in the take games in decision 1 and 3 (B). Recall 
that the maximal payoff of B is 5 euro. 
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Figure 4: Average payoff of the B-players in the take games of decisions 1 and 3. 
 
The two decisions 1 and 3 can be directly compared because in both cases the dictators have 
to decide how much to take in each of the four games. Figure 4 shows that the amount left to 
the B-players does not vary between the four games. This is supported by testing for differ-
ences between games in this respect, which finds none of the differences to be significant in 
decision 1 (p>=0.274, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). In decision 3, more money is left in T1 than 
in T3 but the difference is small (0.24 euro) and only weakly significant (p=0.070).There are 
no other significant differences (p>=0.425, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). Applying a Friedman 
test, the null-hypothesis that the amounts left across the games come from the same popula-
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tion cannot be rejected for decision 3 (p=0.313). It is significant, however, that the dictators in 
all four games leave more to the B-players in decision 3 (p<0.010, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). 
Obviously, the A-players are willing to leave more to the B-player when the recipient is in the 
position to decide which game to play. Since the average amount left to the B-player in all 
four games is the same, the dictators’ decisions do (on average) not depend on the game cho-
sen by the B-player. This is surprising insofar as one might think that the dictator should be 
willing to leave more to the B-player in those cases in which the recipient chooses a produc-
tive game like T1. Obviously the aggregated data do not display any kind of reciprocal beha-
vior on the part of the dictators. 
Dictators on average leave 1.33 of the 5 euros when the game is chosen at random and 2.05 
euros when the B-player decides on the game. Because the productivity of “taking money 
from B” decreases from T1 to T4, the constant absolute amounts taken lead to decreasing 
payoffs for the dictators (A), as figure 5 shows: 
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Figure 5: Average payoff of the A-players in the take games of decisions 1 and 3. 
 
Averaging the payoffs in decision 1 across the four games, dictators choose a payoff of 9.61 
euros when the relevant game is randomly selected. In decision 3, the dictators become more 
generous and their payoff drops to 8.66 euros on average. The behavior shown by the A-
player in decision 2, where A-players also decided which game is relevant, is very similar to 
the behavior in decision 1. In decision 2, 83 of 90 A-players select T1, choosing an average 
payoff of 12.92 euros. This does not differ significantly from the average payoff of 12.77 eu-
ros which they choose in T1 of decision 1 (p=0.555, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). In T1 of deci-
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sion 3, subjects choose a significantly lower payoff for themselves (10.80 euros) than in T1 of 
decision 2 (p<0.001, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). 
Table 4 reports the results of a Tobit-regression for the payoff of the B-player for decision 1 
and 3. Apart from that for  the constant, the only significant coefficient is the one for the deci-
sion. In particular, the game coefficients are not significant. This once again demonstrates that 
dictators do not react to the different prices for gifts to the B-players, but significantly change 
their behavior if the B-Player has the right to choose the relevant game.  
 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Errors) 
T2 
1 if decision in take game 2 and 0 else 
-8.841 
(25.063) 
T3 
1 if decision in take game 3 and 0 else 
1.656 
(25.146) 
T4 
1 if decision in take game 4 and 0 else 
9.983 
(25.205) 
D1 
1 if decision 1 and 0 else 
-144.541*** 
(18.120) 
Constant 246.137*** 
(40.594) 
Rho 0.725 
(0.026) 
N 720 
Log-Likelihood -2453.086 
Chi-squared p-value 0.000 
Random effects Tobit model including session dummies (not reported) 
Dependent variable: Payoff of the B-player 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 4: Take Games - Tobit regression for the payoff of the B-players in decisions 1 and 3 
 
4.3 Behavior in the give games 
Figure 6 shows the average amount of money the dictators kept for themselves (A) in the give 
games. The dictators constantly keep about 12 (12.05 euros) of the 15 euros in all four games 
when the relevant game is chosen randomly and one euro less (10.97 euros) when the B-
player selects the relevant game. Once again, the differences between decision 1 and 3 are 
significant (p<0.05, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests), but between the games within a decision no 
significant difference can be found (p>=0.412, two-tailed Wilcoxon tests). As in the take 
games, the dictators do not react to the different degrees of productivity a euro given to the B-
player has, but their decision is influenced by the way the relevant game is selected. 
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Figure 6: Average payoff of the A-players in the give games of decisions 1 and 3. 
In the take games, the A-players' payoffs decrease with pA and the B-players' payoffs remain 
constant. In the give games, it is  the other way around. As the dictators now decide to keep a 
fixed amount of money for themselves, figure 6 also shows their (constant) payoffs over the 
four games within a decision. Figure 7 demonstrates that the payoffs of the B-players (B) in-
crease in pA in the give games. 
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Figure 7: Average payoff of the B-players in the give games of decisions 1 and 3 
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When A-players can select a game in decision 2, 51 of 88 select G4, earning 11.45 euros on 
average. This does not differ significantly from the 11.94 euros these players earn in G4 of 
decision 1 (p=0.286, two-tailed Wilcoxon test). The 16 (17) subjects choosing G1 (G3) in de-
cision 2 do not behave significantly different in G1 (G3) of decision 1. In both games, they 
opt for an average payoff of about 13 euros (10 euros) (p>=0.438, two-tailed Wilcoxon test).  
 
As for the take games, the Tobit-regression for the amount kept by the A-players in decisions 
1 and 3 in the give games clearly shows that the productivity of the gifts does not have a sig-
nificant influence on the dictator decision, but that the property right does: 
 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Errors) 
G2 
1 if decision in give game 2 and 0 else 
13.291 
(33.015) 
G3 
1 if decision in give game 3 and 0 else 
-5.890 
(32.763) 
G4 
1 if decision in give game 4 and 0 else 
-46.290 
(32.660) 
D1 
1 if decision 1 and 0 else 
118.434*** 
(23.162) 
Constant 1250.482*** 
(41.851) 
Rho 0.729 
(0.020) 
N 704 
Log-Likelihood -3247.078 
Chi-squared p-value 0.000 
Random effects Tobit model including session dummies (not reported) 
Dependent variable: Payoff of the A-player 
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Table 5: Give Games - Tobit regression for the payoff of the A-players in decisions 1 and 3 
 
5 Discussion 
The main results of our experiment are as follows. 
1. Dictators do not condition their choices on the different prices their gifts have in the 
different give and take games. 
2. In the give games, they choose a constant amount they keep for themselves and, in the 
take games, a constant amount left to the B-players. 
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3. Individual decisions significantly depend on the way the payoff-relevant game is se-
lected. In the case of the B-players having the right to choose, dictators are more ge-
nerous. 
All these findings are demonstrated graphically in figure 8: 
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Figure 8: Average payoff for the A- and B-players in decisions 1 and 3 across games 
On the individual level, we found great heterogeneity of behavior but, once again, apparent 
disregard for the price and a systematic reaction to the frame, which is identical to the one ob-
served on the aggregate level. The recipients show heterogeneity in their beliefs about the dic-
tator behavior as the observation that B-players chose different games in decision 3 shows.  
Obviously the question of who owns the “property right” over the games plays an important 
role. This cannot be incorporated into the standard formulation of inequality aversion and al-
truism. Given the same choice among payoff pairs, subjects should always choose the same if 
their behavior only depends on payoff distributions.  
In summary, our experiment shows that the behavior in dictator games cannot be fully ex-
plained by theories focusing solely on preferences over payoff distribution. A somewhat dif-
ferent view of behavior in dictator games seems to be at stake. Obvious features of the games, 
such as the right to choose the relevant game from four possibilities, may serve as a point of 
orientation and forces subjects to be more generous if this right is in the hands of the other 
player. One possible explanation for this property rights effect is that the possession of the 
“right to choose” activates a social norm that forces the dictators to give more to, or take less 
from, the recipient as compared to the situation in which this is the right of the dictator. 
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